We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on incoming edges from players who picked the same strategy augmented by a fixed integer bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination within a local neighbourhood in the absence of globally common strategies. We study the decision problem of checking whether a given set of strategy choices for a subset of the players is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We identify the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNPcompletness of these problems already for unweighted DAGs.
Introduction
Identifying subclasses of games where equilibria is tractable is an important problem in algorithmic analysis of multiplayer games. Pure Nash equilibria (NEs) may not exist in games and checking whether a game has a pure NE is in general a hard problem. Even for subclasses of games in which a pure NE is guaranteed to exists (for instance, potential games) computing one remains PLS-hard (Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar 2004) . Although, Nash's theorem guarantees the existence of mixed strategy NE in all finite games, computing one is still a hard problem. Therefore, identifying restricted classes of games where equilibrium computation is tractable and also precisely identifying the borderline between tractability and hardness in such restricted classes is of obvious interest. In this paper, we study the borderline of tractability in a natural subclass of games where the utilities of players are restricted to be pairwise separable. These are called polymatrix games (Janovskaya 1968) and they form an abstract model that is useful to analyse strategic behaviour of players in games formed via pairwise interactions. In polymatrix games, the payoff for each player is the sum of the payoffs he gets from individual two player games he plays against every other player. Polymatrix games are well-studied in the literature and include game classes with good computational properties like the two-player zero-sum games. They also have applications in areas such as artificial neural networks (Miller and Zucker 1991) and machine learning (Erdem and Pelillo 2012) .
In terms of tractability, the restriction to pairwise interactions does not immediately ensure the existence of efficient algorithms. Computing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete (Cai and Daskalakis 2011) and checking for the existence of a pure NE is NP-complete in general. This motivates the need to further analyse the type of pairwise interactions that would ensure tractability. In this paper, we argue that another important factor which influences tractability is the structure of the underlying interaction graph and presence of individual preferences (that we call bonuses).
The main restriction that we impose on polymatrix games is that each pairwise interaction form a coordination game. Henceforth, we will refer to these games simply as coordination games on graphs. Coordination games are often used in game theory to model situations where players attain maximum payoff when they agree on a common strategy. The game model that we study, extends coordination games to the network setting where payoffs need not always be symmetric and players coordinate within a certain local neighbourhood. The neighbourhood structure is specified by a finite directed graph whose nodes correspond to the players. Each player chooses a colour from a set of available colours. The payoff of a player is the sum of weights on the edges from players who choose the same colour and a fixed bonus for picking that particular colour. This game model is closely related to various well-studied classes of games. For instance, coordination games on graphs are graphical games (Kearns, Littman, and Singh 2001) and they are also related to hedonic games (Dreze and Greenberg 1980; Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002) . In hedonic games, the payoff of each player depends solely on the set of players that selected the same strategy. The coalition formation property inherent to coordination games on graphs make the game model relevant to cluster analysis. The problem of clustering has been studied from a game theoretic perspective for instance in (Feldman, Lewin-Eytan, and Naor 2012; Pelillo and Buló 2014) . Feldman and Friedler (2015) introduced a framework for the analysis of clustering games on networks where the underlying coalition formation graph is undirected and, as a result, a potential game. Hoefer (2007) also studied clustering games that are polymatrix games based on undirected graphs where each player has the same set of strategies. These games are also potential games.
Coordination games on graphs constitute a game model which can be useful for analysing the adoption of a product or service within a network of agents interacting with each other in their local neighbourhoods. For example, consider the selection of a mobile phone operator. The interaction between users can be represented by a coordination game where the weight of the edge from i to j represents the total cost of calls from j to i. Also, the bonus function can represent individual preferences of users over the providers. Now suppose that mobile network operators allow free calls among its users. Then each mobile phone user faces a strategic choice of picking an operator that maximises his cost savings or, in the case of unweighted graphs, maximises the number of people he can call for free. If players are allowed to freely switch their operator based on their friends' choices, then the stable market states correspond to pure Nash equilibria in this game. One can observe similar interactions in peer-to-peer networks, social networks and photo sharing platforms.
A similar game model based on undirected graphs was introduced in (Apt et al. 2014 ) and further studied in (Rahn and Schäfer 2015) . The transition from undirected to directed graphs drastically changes the status of the games. For instance, in the case of undirected graphs, coordination games are potential games whereas in the directed case, Nash equilibria may not even exist. Moreover, the problem of determining the existence of pure NEs is NP-complete for coordination games on directed graphs (Apt, Simon, and Wojtczak 2016). However, pure NE always exists for several natural classes of graphs (Simon and Wojtczak 2016) .
However, in many practical situations, finding just one pure Nash equilibrium may not be enough. In fact, there can be exponentially many Nash equilibria, each with a different payoff to each player (see Example 2). Ideally, we would like to ask for the existence of a Nash equilibrium satisfying some given constraints. In this paper, we focus on checking whether a partial strategy profile (i.e. strategy choices for a subset of the players) is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We will refer to these as ∃NE and ∀NE decision problem, respectively. We identify the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNP-completness of these problems already for unweighted DAGs. Related work. The complexity of checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in a game crucially depends on the representation of the game. Normal form representation can be exponential in the number of players whereas graphical games and polymatrix games provide a more concise representation of strategic form games. While checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria can be solved in LogSpace for games in normal form, it is NP-complete for graphical games even when the payoff of each player depends only on the strategy choices of at most three other players (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005) . On the other hand, it is solvable in polynomial time for graphical games whose dependency graph has a bounded treewidth (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005) or when each player has only two possible strategies (Thomas and van Leeuwen 2015) . For polymatrix games, checking for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete even when all its individual 2-player games are win-loss ones (Apt, Simon, and Wojtczak 2016) . Gilboa and Zelmel (1989) were the first to study the computational complexity of decision problems for mixed Nash equilibria with additional constraints for two player games in normal form. For many natural constraints the corresponding decision problems were shown to be NP-hard. Further hardness results were shown in (Conitzer and Sandholm 2008) and (Bilò and Mavronicolas 2012) . The existence of constrained pure NE can be solved in LogSpace for normal form games simply by checking every pure strategy profile. For graphical games the problem is NP-hard even without any constraints (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005) , but because of the special structure of our games, this result does not directly apply in our setting. On the other hand, constrained pure NE can be found in polynomial time for graphical games played on graphs with a bounded treewidth (Greco and Scarcello 2009). We are not aware of any prior work on this problem for polymatrix games. Our paper is the first to identify several subclasses of polymatrix games for which the existence problem of a constrainted Nash equilibrium is tractable.
Background
A strategic game G = (S 1 , . . . , S n , p 1 , . . . , p n ) with n > 1 players consists of a non-empty set S i of strategies and a payoff function p i : S 1 × · · · × S n → R, for each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let S := S 1 × · · · × S n and let us call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy. Given a joint strategy s, we denote by s(i) the strategy of player i in s. We abbreviate the sequence (s(j)) j =i to s −i and occasionally write (s(i), s −i ) instead of s. We call a strategy s(i) of player i a best response to a joint strategy s −i of his opponents if for all x ∈ S i , p i (s(i), s −i ) ≥ p i (x, s −i ). We do not consider mixed strategies in this paper.
Given two joint strategies s ′ and s, we say that s ′ is a deviation of the player i from s if
, we say that the deviation s ′ from s is profitable for player i. We call a joint strategy s a (pure) Nash equilibrium if no player can profitably deviate from s. For any given strategic game G, let NE(G) denote the set of all (pure) Nash equilibria in G.
We now introduce the class of games we are interested in. Fix a finite set of colours M . A weighted directed graph (G, w) is a structure where G = (V, E) is a graph without self loops over the vertices V = {1, . . . , n} and w is a function that associates with each edge e ∈ E, a nonnegative rational weight w e ∈ Q ≥0 . We say that a node j is a successor of the node i, and i is a predecessor of j, if there is an edge i → j in E. Let N i denote the set of all predecessors of node i in the graph G. By a colour assignment we mean a function that assigns to each node of G a finite non-empty set of colours. A bonus is a function β that to each node i and a colour c assigns an integer β (i, c) .
Given a weighted graph (G, w), a colour assignment C : V → 2 M \ {∅} and a bonus function β : V × M → Z, a strategic game G(G, w, C, β) is defined as follows:
• the players are the nodes;
• the set of strategies of player (node) i is the set of colours C(i);
So each node simultaneously chooses a colour and its payoff is the sum of the weights of the edges from its neighbours that chose the same colour augmented by a bonus to the node from choosing this colour. We call these games coordination games on directed graphs, from now on just coordination games. When the weights of all the edges are 1, we obtain a coordination game whose underlying graph is unweighted. In this case, we simply drop the function w from the description of the game. In this case the payoff function is defined by p i (s) := |{j ∈ N i | s i = s j }| + β (i, s(i) ). Similarly if all the bonuses are 0, we obtain a coordination game without bonuses. Likewise, to denote this game we omit the function β. Note that an edge with positive integer weight w can be simulated by adding w nodes and 2w unweighted edges to the game, and any positive integer bonus can be simulated similarly. However, if all weights and bonuses are represented in binary, as we assume in this paper, such an operation can increase the size of the graph exponentially and be inefficient.
Example 1 Consider the unweighted directed graph and the colour assignment depicted in Figure 1 . Take the joint strategy s that consists of the underlined strategies. Then the payoffs are as follows: 0 for the nodes 1, 7, 8, and 9; 1 for the nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6; 2 for the node 3.
Note that s is not a Nash equilibrium. For example, node 1 can profitably deviate to colour a. In fact the coordination game associated with this graph does not have a Nash equilibrium. Note that for nodes 7, 8 and 9 the only option is to select the unique strategy in its strategy set. The best response for nodes 4, 5 and 6 is to always select the same strategy as nodes 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Therefore, to show that the game does not have a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to consider the strategies of nodes 1, 2 and 3. We denote this by the triple (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ). Below we list all such joint strategies and we underline a strategy that is not a best response to the choice of other players: (a, a, b) , (a, a, c) , (a, c, b) , (a, c, c) , (b, a, b) , (b, a, c) , (b, c, b) and (b, c, c) . ✷ Let Q ⊆ V be a nonempty subset of all the nodes of a given graph G. A query is a function q : Q → M which satisfies the following property: for all i ∈ Q, q(i) ∈ C(i). We say that a query q is consistent with a strategy profile s iff q = s| Q , i.e. q(i) = s(i) for all i ∈ Q. We call a query q : Q → M monochromatic if for all i, j ∈ Q, q(i) = q(j) and otherwise we call the query polychromatic. A query q is said to be singleton if |Q| = 1. Obviously every singleton query is also a monochromatic one. In this paper, we study the following decision questions. Given a graph G = (V, E), weights w, colour assignment C, bonus function β, and query q. (∃NE problem) Is there a Nash equilibrium in G (G, w, C, β) that is consistent with q? (∀NE problem) Is every Nash equilibrium in G(G, w, C, β) consistent with q? Formally, ∃NE problem asks if there exists s ∈ NE(G) such that q = s| Q , while the ∀NE problem asks whether for all s ∈ NE(G) it is the case that q = s| Q . Note that ∀NE is not a complement of ∃NE. Actually, any non-singleton ∀NE query can be reduced to a series of singleton ∀NE queries q| {i} for every player i ∈ Q. Note that trivially ∃NE ∈ NP and ∀NE ∈ coNP, because checking whether a joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium and is consistent with q can be done in polynomial time.
Given a directed graph G and a set of nodes K, we denote by
That is from every node there is an edge to every other node. Given the set of colours M , we say that a directed graph G is colour complete (with respect to a colour assignment C) if for every colour c ∈ M each component of G [V c ] is a complete graph, where
Table 1: Summary of the results. The last two classes are unweighted; a simple reduction from the Partition problem and its complement, shows NP and coNP hardness of their ∃NE and ∀NE problems, respectively, in the weighted case.
In particular, every complete graph is colour complete, but not vice versa (see Figure  4 in the appendix). Table 1 summarises our results in terms of the number of arithmetic operations needed. We use binary representation for all values in w and β. The size of the input game graph is |G| = O(nm + e), where n is the number of nodes in a graph, m is the number of colours and e is the number of edges.
Note that these graph classes can occur naturally in practice. Graphs with two colours can model duopoly markets and simple cycles are used in Token ring architectures. Unweighted DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1 can model indirect elections such as the US primaries where votes are cast for delegates, who may have their own preferences, rather than for presidential nominees directly. In this context, the ∃NE question answers who can become the leader based on the list of candidates each voter realisticly considers voting for (represented by the set of available colours) and ∀NE can tell us if a given candidate wins no matter how the undecided voters (i.e. players with non-singleton set of available colours) vote. Colour complete graphs can model situations where every user benefits as the number of users increases even if they do not know each other directly, e.g. users joining a torrent swarm. Also, in the context of a market with multiple products, the ∃NE/∀NE questions can tell us which product can/will dominate the market in the end.
Graphs with Two or Three Colours
We start by studying coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries. To fix the notation, let G = (V, E) and the colour set be M = {0, 1}. Let q be a monochromatic query. Without loss of generality, we can assume q(i) = 0 for all i ∈ Q, because otherwise we can rename the colours. We show how to deal with the ∃NE decision problem first.
Theorem 1 The ∃NE problem for coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries can be solved in O(|G|) time using Algorithm 1.
Similarly, Algorithm 2 below solves the ∀NE problem for monochromatic queries.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for ∃NE on arbitrary graphs with two colours and monochromatic queries. Input: A coordination game G((V, E), w, C, β) and monochromatic query q : Q → M . Output: YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium consistent with q and NO otherwise.
remove any element from S and assign it to i In fact, any polychromatic ∀NE query can be reduced to two monochromatic ones and so we get the following.
Corollary 1 The ∀NE problem for coordination games with two colours and polychromatic queries can be solved in O(|G|) time.
However, we will show that even answering singleton ∀NE queries for unweighted DAGs is coNP-hard in the presence of three colours and no bonuses. We first analyse the following gadget.
Proposition 1 For any Nash equilibrium s in
Using this gadget we are able to show the following.
Theorem 3 The ∀NE problem for singleton queries is coNP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours and no bonuses.
Proof. We reduce from the tautology problem for formulae in 3-DNF form. Assume we are given a formula
where x ∈ {⊤, ⊥}. Note that one edge has weight k − 1.
Figure 3: Gadget used in the coNP-hardness proof of ∀NE. Edges with weight 2 can be simulated by unweighted ones.
with k clauses and n propositional variables x 1 , . . . , x n , where each a i , b i , c i is a literal equal to x j or ¬x j for some j. We will construct a coordination game G φ of size O(n+k) such that a particular singleton ∀NE query is true for G φ iff φ is a tautology. First for every propositional variable x i there are four
each with two possible colours ⊤ or ⊥. We connect these four nodes using gadgets
This makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, s, we have s(L i ) = ⊤ and s(L i ) = ⊥ iff X i and ¬X i are assigned different colours. Next, for every clause (a i ∧ b i ∧ c i ) in φ we add to the game graph G φ node C i . We use gadget D(a i , b i , c i , ⊥; C i ) to connect literals with clauses, where we identify each x i with X i and each ¬x i with ¬X i . Note that Proposition 1 implies that the colour of C i is ⊤ iff all nodes a i , b i , c i are assigned ⊤. We add two nodes T and F to gather colours ⊤ and ⊥ from the L i and L i nodes. Also, we add an additional node Φ to gather the values of all the clauses. We connect these using gadgets
Now, we need to express that for every Nash equilibrium s: s(T ) = ⊤ and s(F ) = ⊥ implies that s(Φ) = ⊤. For this we use the gadget from Figure 3 . It includes three nodes T, F, Φ that we already defined in G φ . We claim that ∀NE query q(Z) = ⋆ is true for G φ iff Φ is a tautology. (The full proof is in the appendix.) ✷ On the other hand, we can show that answering polychromatic ∃NE queries is NP-hard for unweighted DAGs even with two colours and no bonuses. The construction is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 The ∃NE problem is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with two colours and no bonuses.
Building on this we can show the following when there are three colours to choose from.
Corollary 2 The ∃NE problem for singleton queries is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours and no bonuses.
Note that we can also show NP/coNP-hardness for DAGs with out-degree at most two, because we can make arbitrary number of copies of any given node, e.g. to make three copies i 1 , i 2 , i 3 of node i we can add nodes i
Simple Cycles
We consider here coordination games whose underlying graph is a simple cycle. To fix the notation, suppose that V = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and the underlying graph is 0 → 1 → · · · → n−1 → 0. We assume that the counting is done in cyclic order within {0, . . . , n − 1} using the increment operation i ⊕ 1 and the decrement operation i ⊖ 1. In particular, (n − 1) ⊕ 1 = 0 and 0
} denote the set of colours available to player i with the bonus at most w below the maximum one available to i. For every i ∈ V , define A i := Z i (0), i.e. all colours with the maximum bonus,
It is quite easy to see that in any NE player i can only select a colour from C i . Let us fix a query q : Q → M . In this section, without loss of generality, we assume that 0 ∈ Q (if 0 ∈ Q, then we can always re-label the nodes in the cycle).
Algorithm 3: ∃NE on a simple cycle Input: A simple cycle on nodes {0, . . . , n − 1}, sets
YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium consistent with q and NO otherwise. [sketch] We argue that Algorithm 3 solves the ∃NE problem for simple cycles. In other words, we argue that given a simple cycle over the nodes V = {0, . . . , n − 1} and a query q : Q → M , the output of Algorithm 3 is YES iff there exists a Nash equilibrium s * which is consistent with q. Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium s * which is consistent with q. We can argue by induction on V that on termination of Algorithm 3, for all i ∈ V , we have s * (i) ∈ X i . Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 3 is YES. From the definition, this implies that for all i ∈ V , X i = ∅ and for all j ∈ Q: q(j) ∈ X j (in fact, X j = {q(j)}). We define a Nash equilibrium s * as follows. First, let s * (0) = q(0). Next we assign values to s * (i) starting at i = n − 1 and going down to i = 1 as described below.
• If i ∈ Q and X i ⊆ B i⊕1 then by Algorithm 3 we have
A proof that s * is a NE is in the appendix. ✷ Algo. 4 reduces the ∀NE problem to m ∃NE queries.
Theorem 6
The ∀NE problem for simple cycles (unweighted simple cycles) can be solved in O(m|G|) time (respectively, O(|G|) time using Algorithm 7 in the appendix).
Colour Complete Graphs
We show that ∃NE and ∀NE problems can be solved in polynomial time for coordination games G((V, E), C) played on unweighted colour complete graphs with n nodes and a fixed number of colours, m, and no bonuses.
Theorem 7
The ∃NE and ∀NE problems for unweighted colour complete graphs and no bonuses can be solved in O(nm · m!) time.
Proof. We claim that the set of total orders on the set of colours induces a set of joint strategies which contains the whole set NE(G). Specifically, every total order on M will be mapped to a joint strategy SP( ) as follows: assign to each player the highest colour available to him according to the total order . Formally, for all players i: SP( )(i) = max C(i). For any Nash equilibrium s let us define a relation ≻ s ⊆ M × M : x ≻ s y iff there exists player i such that {x, y} ⊆ C(i) and From Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 we know that for every Nash equilibrium s, there exists at least one total order on M that induces it. Therefore, for ∃NE problem (∀NE problem) it suffices to check for all possible total orders on M , whether the induced joint strategy SP( ), is a Nash equilibrium and if so, whether any (respectively, all) of them is consistent with q. There are m! total orders on M . Checking whether an induced strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium consistent with q takes O(nm) time. This gives O(nm · m!) in total. ✷ Note that there are coordination games on colour complete graphs with one-to-one correspondence between the set of total orders on colours and the set of all Nash equilibria (Example 2 in the appendix), and so with exponentially many different NEs.
Directed Acyclic Graphs
In Section 3 we showed that the ∃NE and ∀NE problems are NP and coNP complete respectively even for unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most two and no bonuses. We now show that if the out-degree of each node in an unweighted DAG is at most 1 (there are no constraints on the in-degree of nodes) then these problems can be solved efficiently.
Theorem 8 Algorithm 5 solves the ∃NE problem for unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most one in
Proof.
[sketch] Intuitively, for each node, i, we compute the set, X(i), of colours that can possibly be assigned to i in any Nash equilibrium. Such a set is trivial to compute for source nodes in G, and for the other nodes it can be computed by constructing a suitable bipartite graph based on the sets precomputed for all its neighbours and running a matching algorithm. In lines 7-10 we remove colours that are dominated by others. We need the following lemma. 
Construct the following bipartite graph
Lemma 4 If Algorithm 5 returns YES, then for all i ∈ V , for all c ∈ X(i), there exists a Nash equilibrium s *
such that s * i = c and for all j = i, s * j ∈ X(j). Now, if Algorithm 5 returns YES, then from the definition, for all i ∈ V , A i = ∅ and for all j ∈ P , A j = {q(j)}. By Lemma 4 it follows that there exists a Nash equilibrium s * which is consistent with q.
Conversely, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium s * which is consistent with q. Let θ = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) be the topological ordering of V chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 5. We argue that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s * (i j ) ∈ X(i j ). The claim follows easily for i 1 . Consider a node i m and suppose for all j < m, s 
We claim that if the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm is used for each matching at line 11, then Algorithm 5 runs in O(|G| 2.5 ). First, for each node k, X(k) is in Y at most once and so is matched at most once for each colour. We claim that the worst case running time is for |Y | = |V |. Now, due to lines 9-10 we have |S| + 
Conclusions
We presented a simple class of coordination games on directed graphs. We focused on checking whether a given partial colouring of a subset of the nodes is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We showed these problems to be NP-complete and coNP-complete, respectively, in general. However, we also identified several natural cases when these decision problems are tractable. In the case of weighted DAGs with out-degree at most one and colour complete graphs with no bonuses a simple reduction from the Partition problem and its complement, shows NP and coNP-hardness of their ∃NE and ∀NE problems, respectively. This does not exclude the possibility that pseudo-polynomial algorithms exist for these problems. We conjecture that even for unweighted colour complete graphs these problems are NP/coNP-hard in the presence of bonuses or when the set of colours, M , is not fixed.
There are several ways our results can be extended further. One is to study other constraints, e.g. uniqueness of Nash equilibrium or checking maximum payoff for a given player. Another is to look at different solution concepts, e.g. strong equilibria. And yet another is to look for more classes of graphs that can be analysed in polynomial time. Given that these decision problems are already computationally hard for DAGs with three colours, the possibilities for such new classes are rather limited.
Finally, we only focused on pure Nash equilibria in this paper, which may not exist for general graphs. On the other hand, mixed Nash equilibria always exist due to Nash's theorem. It would be interesting to know whether the complexity of finding one is PPADcomplete problem just like it is for general polymatrix games (Cai and Daskalakis 2011). Proof. We show that Algorithm 1 solves the ∃NE problem and that its running time is O(|G|). Let be a partial order on all joint strategies s : V → M defined as follows: s s ′ iff for all i ∈ V , s(i) ≤ s ′ (i). Let s 0 denote the value of s once line 3 is reached. The colouring s 0 may not be a Nash equilibrium, so Algorithm 1 tries to correct this with the minimum number of switches from 0 to 1. Note that for any colouring s we have s 0 s. Note that lines 3-9 of Algorithm 1 can be seen as a function F : (V → M ) → (V → M ) from the initial colouring, in this case s 0 , to a new colouring,
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. This is simply because the more colour 1 is used initially, the more players would like to switch to it. Also, any Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of F , because no player would like to switch at line 7. We now need the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For every joint strategy s, F (s) is a Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm 6: Algorithm for ∀NE on unweighted DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1. Input: A coordination game G((V, E), C, β) and query q : Q → M Output: YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent with q and NO otherwise. 1 Topologically sort V into a sequence (i 1 , . . . , i n ) .
where 
Proof. Every node with colour 1 in F (s) is added to the set S at most once: either at the beginning or when it switches from 0 to 1. If a node does not have a predecessor with colour 1, it cannot possibly have an incentive to switch to 1, because this would give him reward 0. Every time a predecessor of a node switches to 1, we consider that node in line 7 and whether it is beneficial for it to switch to 1. If at no point it was, then colour 0 has to be this player's best response in F (s). Also, no player can have an incentive to switch back from 1 to 0 because the payoff for choosing 1 is weakly increasing for every player after each strategy update. ✷ Now, if Algorithm 1 returns YES, then the correctness follows from Lemma 5. Since in this case, F (s 0 ) is consistent with q and by Lemma 5 it is a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if Algorithm 1 returns NO then there exists i ∈ Q such that F (s 0 )(i) = 1. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium s ′ consistent with q. Then
To analyse its computational complexity, note that each node can be added to the set S at most once, because the colour of each node changes at most once and so each edge is considered at most once as well. Moreover, we can compute p j ((1, s −j )) and p j (s) in constant time, by storing for each node the sum of weights of edges from neighbours with colour 1. Every time the colour of a node j changes in line 8, for any neighbour i of j we add the weight of the edge leading from j to i to the stored value for node i; we need to make such an update O(e) times in total. Thus the total complexity of this algorithm is O(n + e). ✷
Theorem 2
The ∀NE problem for coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries can be solved in O(|G|) time using Algorithm 2.
Proof. Let s 0 be the joint strategy defined by lines 1-2 in Algorithm 2. By an argument very similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that F (s 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium. If Algorithm 2 returns NO then there exists a j ∈ Q such that F (s 0 )(j) = q(j). Therefore, F (s 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium which is not consistent with q.
To show the converse, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we define a partial order on joint strategies as before. Note that for any joint strategy s we have s s 0 . Again, note that lines 3-9 of Algorithm 2 define a func-
. Now suppose that Algorithm 2 returns YES then for all i ∈ Q: F (s 0 )(i) = 0. We need to prove that every Nash equilibrium is consistent with q. Suppose this is not the case, then there exists a Nash equilibrium s ′ and a node j ∈ Q such that s ′ (j) = q(j). By our assumption, this implies that s ′ (j) = 1. We have s
. From s ′ (j) = 1 and F (s 0 )(j) = 0 we get a contradiction.
The time complexity analysis of Algorithm 2 is the same as that of Algorithm 1. ✷
Corollary 1
The ∀NE problem for coordination games with two colours and polychromatic queries can be solved in O(|G|) time.
Proof. Let q : Q → M be a polychromatic query. Define P 0 and P 1 to be the sets of players asked to pick 0 and 1, respectively, by q. Formally, P 0 = {i ∈ Q | q(i) = 0} and P 1 = {i ∈ Q | q(i) = 1}. Let q 0 = q| P0 and q 1 = q| P1 . It can be verified that every Nash equilibria is consistent with q iff every Nash equilibria is consistent with q 0 and q 1 . Note that both q 0 and q 1 are monochromatic queries and therefore, by Theorem 2, both of them can be answered in O(|G|) time. Thus the claim follows. ✷ Proof. To prove coNP-hardness we provide a reduction from the tautology problem for formulae in 3-DNF form, which is coNP-complete. Assume we are given a 3-DNF formula
Proposition 1 For any Nash equilibrium s in
with k clauses and n propositional variables x 1 , . . . , x n , where each a i , b i , c i is a literal equal to x j or ¬x j for some j. We will construct a coordination game G φ of size O(n+k) such that a particular singleton ∀NE query is true for G φ iff φ evaluates to true for all truth assignments. First for every propositional variable x i there are four
each with two possible colours ⊤ or ⊥. We connect these four nodes using
This makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, s, we have s(L i ) = ⊤ and s(L i ) = ⊥ iff X i and ¬X i are assigned different colours.
Next, for every clause (a i ∨ b i ∨ c i ) in φ we add to the game graph G φ node C i .
We use gadget D(a i , b i , c i , ⊥; C i ) to connect literals with clauses, where we identify each x i with X i and each ¬x i with ¬X i . Note that Proposition 1 implies that the colour of C i is ⊤ iff all nodes a i , b i , c i are assigned ⊤.
We add two nodes T and F to gather colours ⊤ and ⊥ from the L i and L i nodes. Also, we add an additional node Φ to gather the values of all the clauses. We connect these using gadgets and D(C 1 , . . . , C k , ⊤; Φ). The first two gadgets guarantee that if in a Nash equilibrium s the colour of T is ⊤ and the colour of F is ⊥ then s corresponds to a valid truth assignment. The last gadget guarantees that the colour of Φ is ⊤ iff at least one of C i -s has colour ⊤. Now, we need to express that for every Nash equilibrium s: s(T ) = ⊤ and s(F ) = ⊥ implies that s(Φ) = ⊤. We will use gadget from Figure 3 . It consists of the three nodes T, F, Φ that we already defined in G φ and several additional ones. We claim that ∀NE query q(Z) = ⋆ is true for G φ iff Φ is a tautology. However, equivalently, we will prove that ∀NE query q(Z) = ⋆ is false for G φ iff φ is not a tautology. (⇒) Let s be a Nash equilibrium which does not satisfy query q(Z) = ⋆, which essentially means that s(Z) = ⊥. We will show that the following truth assignment ν(x i ) = s(X i ) makes φ false. Looking at the gadget in Figure 3 we can easily deduce that all nodes W, X, Y are assigned ⊥ in s, because otherwise Z would have an incentive to switch to ⋆. This means that it has to be s(X) = s(Φ) = ⊥, and
, but then ν makes every clause in φ false, and so also makes the whole formula φ false. (⇐) Let ν : {x 1 , . . . , x n } → {⊤, ⊥} be a truth assignment that makes φ false. We form the following Nash equilibrium, s, by first setting s(X i ) = ν(x i ) and s(¬X i ) = ¬ν(x i ) for all i. Note that this makes the best response of nodes L i to be ⊤ and of nodes L i to be ⊥. It follows that the best responses of T and F are ⊤ and ⊥, respectively. On the other hand, since ν makes φ false, all clauses C 1 , . . . , C n in φ are false, and so for all i: s(C i ) = ⊥ is C i 's best response. Finally, the best response of node Φ is ⊥. Looking at the gadget in Figure 3 , given the values
are these nodes best responses. Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium which does not satisfy query q(Z) = ⋆. ✷ Theorem 4 The ∃NE problem is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with two colours and no bonuses.
Proof.
To prove NP-hardness we provide a reduction from the 3-SAT problem, which is NP-complete. Assume we are given a 3-SAT formula
with k clauses and n propositional variables x 1 , . . . , x n , where each a i , b i , c i is a literal equal to x j or ¬x j for some j. We will construct a coordination game G φ of size O(n + k) such that a particular ∃NE query is true for G φ iff φ is satisfiable.
First, for every propositional variable x i there are four nodes X i , ¬X i , L i , L i in G φ , each with two possible colours ⊤ or ⊥. Intuitively, for a given truth assignment, if x i is true then ⊤ should be chosen for X i and ⊥ should be chosen for ¬X i , and the other way around if x i is false. To select only the Nash equilibria which correspond to valid truth assignments we make use of the gadget D presented in Figure 2 . We connect these four nodes using gadgets
This make sure that in any Nash equilibrium, s, we have s(L i ) = ⊤ and s(L i ) = ⊥ iff X i and ¬X i are assigned different colours. This is because from Proposition 1 it follows that if s(L i ) = ⊤ then ⊤ is assigned to at least one of X i , ¬X i and if s(L i ) = ⊥ then ⊥ is assigned to at least one of them as well. So necessarily, ⊤ and ⊥ are assigned to exactly one of them.
We use gadget D(a i , b i , c i , ⊤; C i ) to connect literals with clauses, where we identify each x i with X i and each ¬x i with ¬X i . Note that Proposition 1 implies that s(C i ) = ⊤ iff at least one of nodes a i , b i , c i is assigned ⊤.
Finally, we have two nodes T and F which gather all nodes whose colours should be ⊤ and ⊥, respectively.
We connect these us-
We claim that ∃NE query q(T ) = ⊤, q(F ) = ⊥ is true for G φ iff φ is satisfiable.
(⇒) Assume that s is a Nash equilibrium consistent with q in the game G φ . We claim that the truth assignment ν : {x 1 , . . . , x n } → {⊤, ⊥} that assigns ν(
Since s is a Nash equilibrium and s(T ) = ⊤, Proposition 1 implies that all L i -s and C i -s are assigned colour ⊤. Similarly, s(F ) = ⊥ implies that all L i -s are assigned colour ⊥. But this means that the assignment of the colours to X i -s and ¬X i -s corresponds to a valid truth assignment. Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . ., k}: s(C i ) = ⊤ implies that at least one of the literals a i , b i , c i is assigned ⊤. Therefore ν makes every clause C i true and so the whole formula φ true as well.
(⇐) Assume φ is satisfiable. Take a truth assignment ν : {x 1 , . . . , x n } → {⊤, ⊥} that makes φ true. We will construct a Nash equilibrium s consistent with q. For all Proof. To prove NP-hardness we again reduce from the 3-SAT problem. Assume we are given a 3-SAT formula φ. In Theorem 4 we constructed a game G φ for which φ is satisfiable iff ∃NE query q(T ) = ⊤, q(F ) = ⊥ is true for G φ , where T and F are two nodes of G φ . We now combine this reduction with the gadget depicted in Figure 2 , which consists of several nodes including nodes T and F from G φ , to form a new game G ′ φ . We claim that a singleton query q(Z) = ⋆ is true in G Proof. We show that given a simple cycle over the nodes V = {0, . . . , n − 1} and a query q : Q → M , the output of Algorithm 3 is YES iff there exists a Nash equilibrium s * which is consistent with q. Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium s * which is consistent with q. We can argue by induction on n that on termination of Algorithm 3, for all i ≤ n, we have s * (i) ∈ X i , which in turn implies that the output of Algorithm 3 is YES. Since s * is consistent with q, we have s * (0) = q(0) and by line 1 of Algorithm 3, X 0 = {s * (0)}. Assume that we have s * (i) ∈ X i and consider the iteration of the loop in line 2 of Algorithm 3 for i ⊕ 1. We have the following cases.
If
, by the definition of B i⊕1 and the fact that s * is a Nash equilibrium, we have that s * (i⊕1) = s * (i). This is because s * (i) strictly dominates any other strategy choice for node i ⊕ 1. By line 6 in Algorithm 3, we have X i⊕1 = X i and therefore, s * (i ⊕ 1) ∈ X i⊕1 . If X i ⊆ B i⊕1 and s * (i ⊕ 1) ∈ A i⊕1 then by line 4 of Algorithm 3, we have s * (i ⊕ 1) ∈ X i⊕1 . If s * (i ⊕ 1) ∈ A i⊕1 , then since s * is a Nash equilibrium, s * (i ⊕ 1) = s * (i) and s * (i ⊕ 1) ∈ C i⊕1 (otherwise node i ⊕ 1 would have a profitable deviation to a strategy in A i⊕1 ). Therefore, by line 4 of Algorithm 3, we have s
Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 3 is YES. From the definition, this implies that for all i ∈ V , X i = ∅ and for all j ∈ Q: q(j) ∈ X j (in fact, X j = {q(j)}). We define a Nash equilibrium s * as follows. First, let s * (0) = q(0). Next we assign values to s * (i) starting at i = n − 1 and going down to i = 1 as described below.
• If i ∈ Q then s * (i) = q(i).
• If i ∈ Q and X i ⊆ B i⊕1 then by Algorithm 3 we have X i⊕1 = X i . Let s * (i) = s * (i ⊕ 1).
• Assume i ∈ Q and X i ⊆ B i⊕1 . If s * (i⊕1) ∈ X i ∩C i⊕1 set s * (i) = s * (i ⊕ 1). Otherwise s * (i ⊕ 1) ∈ A i⊕1 and we set s * (i) to any element in X i \ B i⊕1 .
It is straightforward to verify that for the joint strategy s * defined as above, for all i ∈ V , s * (i) ∈ X i . We now argue that s * is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose not, then there exists j ∈ V and a strategy x ∈ C(j) such that p j (x, s * −j ) > p j (s * ). We have the following cases.
Case j ∈ Q. If X j⊖1 ⊆ B j then by the definition of s * , we have s * (j) = s * (j ⊖ 1) and so x = s * (j ⊖ 1). By the definition of B j and X j⊖1 , we have that for all strategies y ∈ C(j): β(j, s * (j)) + w j⊖1→j − 1 ≥ β(j, y). Now, we have that p j (s * ) = β(j, s * (j)) + w j⊖1→j ≥ β(j, x) + 1 > p j (x, s * −j ) which is a contradiction. If X j⊖1 ⊆ B j and s * (j) ∈ X j⊖1 ∩ C j then by the definition of s * we have s * (j) = s * (j ⊖ 1), and so x = s * (j ⊖ 1). By the definition of C j , we have that p j (s * ) = β(j, s * (j)) + w j⊖1→j ≥ β(j, x) = p j (x, s * −j ); a contradiction.
If X j⊖1 ⊆ B j and s * (j) ∈ X j⊖1 ∩ C j then by the definition of s * , we have s * (j) ∈ A j and s * (j ⊖ 1) ∈ B j . From the former, β(j, s * (j)) ≥ β(j, y) for all strategies y. From the latter, it follows that β(j, x) ≤ β(j, s * (j)) + w j⊖1→j , because all bonuses are integers. Thus p j (s * ) = β(j, s * (j)) ≥ p j (y, s * −j ) for all y ∈ C(j); a contradiction. Case j ∈ Q. Consider the value of X j in line 7 of Algorithm 3 during the iteration when i = j ⊖ 1. Since the output of Algorithm 3 is assumed to be YES, we have that q(j) ∈ X j . Now applying a similar case analysis as above, we can argue that node j does not have a profitable deviation from s * . ✷
Theorem 6
